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CIVIL RIGHTS-RACIAL DISCRIMINATION-FAIR HOUSING ACT OF
1968-STANDING FOR TESTERS- The Supreme Court of the United
States has granted standing under section 804(d) of the Fair Hous-
ing Act of 1968 to testers who are given false information concern-
ing the availability of housing.
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 102 S. Ct. 1114 (1982).
Havens Realty Corporation owned and operated two apartment
complexes in Henrico County, Virginia, a suburb of Richmond.'
One complex, the Camelot Townhouses, was populated predomi-
nately by whites while the other, the Colonial Court Apartments,
was integrated.2 Sylvia Coleman, a black female, and R. Kent Wil-
lis, a white male, were employed by a nonprofit organization,
Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME), as testers in an ef-
fort to determine whether Havens practiced racial steering4 in vio-
lation of section 804 of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (Act or Fair
Housing Act).5 On three occasions in March, 1978, Coleman and
Willis inquired separately about the availability of apartments in
Havens' complexes.' On all three occasions Coleman was told that
no apartments were available, while Willis was informed that there
were vacancies. On July 6, 1978, Coleman again inquired at
Havens about vacancies at Camelot Townhouses and was told that
no apartments were available; on the same day a white tester was
told that there were vacancies at Camelot.'
On July 13, 1978, Havens was contacted by Paul Coles, a black
actually seeking to rent an apartment, concerning possible vacan-
1. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1118 (1982).
2. Id. at 1118 n.4.
3. Id. at 1118. HOME was incorporated under the laws of Virginia and had an avowed
purpose of making equal opportunities in housing a reality in the Richmond area. Its 600
person membership was multi-racial. HOME operated a housing counseling service and in-
vestigated and referred complaints of housing discrimination. Id. at 1119.
4. Id. at 1118. Respondent's complaint defined racial steering as the steering, by real
estate agents and brokers, of members of racial groups to areas occupied by members of
their own race and away from areas occupied by members of other races. Id. at n.1.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976).
6. 102 S. Ct. at 1118-19.
7. Id. at 1119.
8. Id. The white tester was not a party to the complaint. Id.
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cies at Camelot Townhouses. Coles was told falsely that there were
no vacancies.'
On January 9, 1979, Coleman, Willis, Coles, and HOME filed a
class action suit10 in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia," alleging that Havens had practiced racial
steering in violation of section 804 of the Fair Housing Act of
1968.1 In the complaint, Coles alleged that he had been denied the
right to rent realty in Henrico County, and Coleman claimed that
the false information about available apartments given to her by
Havens had caused her specific injury. Additionally, the individ-
ual complainants contended that due to Havens' practices, each
had been deprived of the benefits that arise from living in an inte-
grated community free from housing discrimination. " HOME al-
leged that its members had been deprived of the benefits of living
in an integrated community free from housing discrimination, and
that its counseling and referral services had been frustrated, result-
ing in a drain on its resources.'
5
On a pretrial motion by Havens, the district court dismissed the
claims of Coleman, Willis, and HOME, 16 declaring that they lacked
9. Id. at 1118.
10. Id. The class consisted of all persons who had rented or sought to rent residential
property in Henrico County, Virginia, and who were adversely affected by Havens' discrimi-
natory acts, policies, and practices. Id. at n.3. The complaint sought declaratory, injunctive,
and monetary relief. Id. at 1118.
11. The decision is unreported.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976). § 3604 provides in pertinent part that it shall be unlawful:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such
dwelling is in fact so available.
Id.
13. 102 S. Ct. at 1119.
14. Id. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged deprivation of the "important social, profes-
sional, business and economic, political and aesthetic benefits of interracial associations that
arise from living in integrated communities free from discriminatory housing practices." Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Following the dismissal of these complaints, the claims of Cole went to trial, a
class was certified, and Havens was found to have engaged in racial steering. The district
court found that Havens' practices violated both the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The district court entered a consent




standing and that their claims were time barred by the Act's 180
day statute of limitations.17 The dismissed plaintiffs appealed, and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that Coleman and Willis had alleged suffi-
cient injury both as testers and as individuals deprived of the ben-
efits of living in an integrated community to grant them standing
at the pleading stage.18 The Fourth Circuit also held that HOME
had standing both in its own right and as a representative of its
members.' 9 With respect to the statute of limitations, the Fourth
Circuit held that Havens' actions constituted a continuing viola-
tion of the Act occurring through July 13, 1978, within the 180 day
statute of limitations; therefore, none of the claims were time
barred.2 0 Havens appealed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari."'
Justice Brennan, writing the opinion for a unanimous Court, 2
first considered the issue of standing of the parties.2 3 In analyzing
the issue, he was guided by the Court's decision in Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood.2 " Justice Brennan explained that
17. 102 S.Ct. at 1119. The Act provides: "A civil action shall be commenced within one
hundred and eighty days after the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred....
Fair Housing Act § 812(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1976).
18. Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384, 387-88 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 102 S.Ct. 1114 (1982).
19. Id. at 390.
20. Id. at 393.
21. Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 451 U.S. 905 (1981).
22. 102 S.Ct. at 1118.
23. Id. at 1120. Before the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, the parties in the pre-
sent case entered into an agreement, subject to approval by the district court, which pro-
vided that if the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari and affirm, or to deny certiorari,
respondents would receive four hundred dollars and no further relief. If the Supreme Court
were to grant certiorari and reverse, respondents would be entitled to no relief at all. Id.
The Supreme Court held that neither of these events rendered the case moot, because
respondents here could not claim against the Coles' award, and the letter agreement was
merely an attempt to liquidate the damages. Settling upon a measure of damages did not
moot their claims and the case retained its adversary character. Id.
The Supreme Court did not address the lower court's finding of a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) because that issue was not before it in the present case. 102
S.Ct. at 1120 n.7.
24. 441 U.S. 91 (1979). In Bellwood, six individuals and the Village of Bellwood, Illi-
nois, brought suit under § 812(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1976), which provides in
relevant part: "The rights granted by sections 3603, 3604, 3605, and 3606 of this title may be
enforced by civil actions in appropriate United States district courts. .. ." The individual
plaintiffs were testers and alleged, inter alia, that they had been deprived of the benefits of
living in an integrated community. The Court ruled that this was a sufficient injury to grant
Duquesne Law Review
the Bellwood Court had concluded that Congress intended stand-
ing under section 812 of the Act to extend to the full limits of arti-
cle III of the Constitution,25 and that courts therefore lacked the
power to create prudential barriers to standing.26 Thus, Justice
Brennan noted, to acquire the requisite standing to bring an action
under the Act, the plaintiff must allege that he had suffered an
injury-in-fact as a result of the defendant's actions. With the
Bellwood rule as a guide, Justice Brennan examined the standing
of each of the respondents.
Noting that the Fourth Circuit had determined that both Cole-
man and Willis had standing to sue as testers,28 Justice Brennan
addressed the question of tester standing by first finding that sec-
tion 804(d) of the Act makes it unlawful to provide false informa-
tion to anyone about the availability of dwellings for sale or rent.29
He reasoned that Congress had intended by this section to grant a
right to truthful information to anyone, including testers.3 0 Citing
earlier decisions by the Court which had determined that the arti-
cle III requirement of injury could be met solely by the invasion of
a statutorily created right,3" Justice Brennan declared that if Cole-
man's allegations were true, then she had suffered injury to her
statutory right to truthful housing information in precisely the
form against which section 804(d) had been intended to protect.
3 2
standing to the four individuals who were residents of the twelve block area affected by the
illegal steering practices of two real estate brokers. Id. at 109-12.
25. Id. at 103 n.9. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III.
26. 102 S. Ct. at 1121. See 441 U.S. at 109.
27. 102 S. Ct. at 1121. The plaintiff must allege that he has suffered a distinct and
palpable injury as a result of defendant's actions in order to meet the injury-in-fact require-
ments. Id. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
28. 633 F.2d at 387.
29. 102 S. Ct. at 1121. This is a prohibition made enforceable by § 812(a) of the Act.
See supra notes 12, 24.
30. 102 S. Ct. at 1121.
31. See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (mother of an illegitimate child
was found to lack standing to challenge a support statute on the ground that it discrimi-
nated between legitimate and illegitimate children); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring) ("[aibsent the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
I would have great difficulty in concluding that petitioners' complaint in this case presented
a case or controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court under Article III of the
Constitution"); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) (private utility company
had standing to sue under statute enjoining Tennessee Valley Authority from supplying
power to two towns within the private company's service area).
32. 102 S. Ct. at 1121. A tester with no intention of buying or renting a home could
still sustain injuries within the ambit of § 804(d). Id.
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Willis, on the other hand, had not claimed that Havens had
given him false information about available apartments. On each
occasion that he inquired, he was told that there were vacancies.
Justice Brennan concluded that he had pleaded no injury to his
statutory right to truthful housing information and thus had stated
no cause of action under section 804(d).3 3 He therefore reversed
the Fourth Circuit's determination that Willis had standing to sue
as a tester.34
Justice Brennan next addressed the claims of Coleman and Wil-
lis that, regardless of their claims as testers, they had been de-
prived, as individuals, of the benefits that arise from living in an
integrated community because of Havens' steering practices. He
ruled that their allegations were sufficient to grant them standing
at the pleading stage.s8 Justice Brennan distinguished "neighbor-
hood" standing from "tester" standing" by explaining that the in-
jury in neighborhood standing is indirect, while the injury in tester
standing is direct.3 7 According to Justice Brennan, this indirectness
of the injury was of little significance because of the Bellwood rule:
only injury-in-fact, either direct or indirect, must be alleged. 8 The
article III requirement of injury-in-fact would be satisfied, accord-
ing to Justice Brennan, if Coleman and Willis had alleged distinct
and palpable injuries which were fairly traceable to Havens'
actions.3 '
Justice Brennan found the neighborhood injuries alleged by re-
spondents40 to be similar in nature to those found sufficient in
Bellwood,41 but noted that Bellwood and earlier cases had upheld
standing based on neighborhood impact only within relatively
33. Id. at 1122.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1124.
36. "Neighborhood" standing is based on an adverse impact upon the plaintiff's com-
munity by the steering of someone other than the plaintiff. "Tester" standing is based upon
a violation of the tester's own statutory right to truthful housing information. Id. at 1122.
"The distinction is between 'third party' and 'first party' standing." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. See also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261
(1977) (plaintiff must demonstrate that he was himself injured by the defendant's actions,
but the injury can be indirect).
40. See supra note 14.
41. The plaintiffs in Bellwood had alleged injury from the loss of social and profes-
sional benefits that arise from living in integrated communities. 441 U.S. at 95.
1982
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compact neighborhoods. 42 He agreed with Havens' contentions that
respondent's pleadings, which were no more specific than to state
that they were residents of Henrico County or of the City of Rich-
mond,43 did not demonstrate how Havens' steering practices within
its housing complexes had affected the particular neighborhoods in
which the respondents resided.44 Justice Brennan agreed with the
Fourth Circuit's holding, however, that under the liberal federal
pleading standards, dismissal at the pleading stage was inappropri-
ate. 45 He ordered the district court on remand to afford the respon-
dents a chance to amend their complaint to make it more definite,
subject to dismissal if they still failed to meet the Supreme Court's
guidelines for standing.
46
Justice Brennan next considered the issue of whether HOME
could assert standing in its own right.4 7 He applied the same test
for standing that he had used with the individual respondents:
whether HOME had alleged a sufficient personal stake in the out-
come of the suit to warrant the invocation of federal court jurisdic-
tion.48 The frustration of HOME's ability to provide counseling
and referral services and the resulting drain on its resources were
sufficiently concrete to constitute injury-in-fact; therefore, Justice
Brennan agreed with the Fourth Circuit that HOME had standing
to bring an action on its own behalf.
49
Finally, the Court considered the issue of whether any or all of
42. 102 S. Ct. at 1123. In Bellwood, the area involved was a 12 by 13 block area of the
Village of Bellwood. See 441 U.S. at 91. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205 (1972), the Supreme Court granted standing to sue to two residents of an 8,200
resident apartment complex who claimed they had been denied the benefits of living in an
integrated community.
43. 102 S. Ct. at 1123. The population of the City of Richmond was 219,883 and cov-
ered 37 square miles. Henrico County covered more than 232 square miles and had a popu-
lation of 172,922. 633 F.2d at 391 n.5. See infra text accompanying notes 59-62.
44. 102 S. Ct. at 1123. Justice Brennan noted the implausibility of the respondent's
argument that Havens' discriminatory acts could have affected the entire Richmond metro-
politan area. Id.
45. Id. at 1124.
46. Id. Respondents could amend their complaint to identify the particular neighbor-
hoods in which they lived, or establish the proximity of their homes to the housing com-
plexes in which Havens' alleged steering had occurred. Id. at 1123.
47. Id. at 1124. In its brief to the Supreme Court, HOME had suggested that the
Court need not decide whether HOME had standing in its representative capacity. In the
letter agreement with Havens, HOME had also agreed to abandon its claim for injunctive
relief in its representative capacity if the district court approved the settlement. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1124-25.
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the claims were time barred by the section 812(a) statute of limita-
tions, which requires a suit to be brought within 180 days of the
occurrence of a discriminatory housing practice.50 Noting that stat-
utes of limitations were intended to keep stale claims out of the
courts,51 Justice Brennan agreed with the Fourth Circuit that con-
tinuing violations merit different treatment than discrete acts of
discrimination. 2 The staleness concern disappears with continuing
violations, so complaints challenging unlawful practices and not
mere isolated incidents are timely if filed within 180 days of the
last occurrence.58
The Fourth Circuit had held that all of the claims were based on
continuing violations so that none of them were time barred.5 The
Supreme Court affirmed this ruling as it applied to the neighbor-
hood claims of Coleman and Willis and the claims of HOME.55
Justice Brennan explained that these claims were indeed timely
because they were based upon a continuing violation which had
been manifested in several incidents, the last of which occurred
within 180 days of the complaint." Coleman could not take advan-
tage of the continuing violation theory on her tester claim, how-
ever, because she had asserted that on four separate, isolated occa-
sions she had been given false information. 7 Coleman could not
claim that the incident involving Coles had deprived her of her
right to truthful housing information, and her tester claim, Justice
Brennan held, was therefore time barred."
Justice Powell in a concurring opinion,59 joined in the Court's
decision, but expressed concern about the laxity of the pleadings"
50. See supra note 17.
51. 102 S. Ct. at 1125. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945)
(statutes of limitations are practical devices designed to keep the courts from having to
litigate claims after evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disap-
peared or forgotten the details of the case).
52. 102 S. Ct. at 1125.
53. Id.
54. 633 F.2d at 392-93.
55. 102 S. Ct. at 1125.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1125-26.
58. Id.
59. 102 S. Ct. at 1126 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. Id. Justice Powell was concerned about the vague allegations of Coleman and Wil-
lis that they were residents of Richmond or Henrico County. Id. See supra note 43 and text
accompanying notes 43 and 44.
1982
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in the case. He emphasized that a distinct and palpable injury still
remains the minimum requirement for standing in the federal
courts."1 Justice Powell considered the pleadings of Coleman and
Willis alleging deprivation of the benefits of living in an integrated
community to be so vague that it was impossible to ascertain
whether any injury-in-fact had occurred.2 Bellwood had upheld
standing only where the alleged impact of the discrimination had
occurred within a relatively compact neighborhood; however, Cole-
man and Willis had alleged residency broadly in Henrico County
or the City of Richmond. Justice Powell was troubled by the vague
averment of standing and by the fact that either the district court
or counsel for the parties could have sought a more specific plead-
ing under the federal rules." Since neither did, however, both the
Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court had been called upon to
review pleadings which gave virtually no indication of a sufficient
injury to justify federal jurisdiction." Justice Powell considered
this a burden on the federal courts and the parties, as well as a
threatened trivialization of the article III injury-in-fact require-
ment. 6 He concluded that even though the case had reached the
Court after nearly four years of futile litigation, it was not within
the Court's province to order a dismissal.66
The Supreme Court has approached the question of standing
from two aspects: the constitutional limitations placed upon fed-
eral court jurisdiction, and prudential considerations about the ex-
ercise of that jurisdiction. Article III of the Constitution limits the
61. 102 S. Ct. at 1126 (Powell, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 1127 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 1126-27 (Powell, J., concurring). See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
(1975): "[I]t is within the trial court's power to allow or to require the plaintiff to supply, by
amendment to the complaint or by affadavits, further particularized allegations of fact
deemed supportive of plaintiff's standing."
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e) provides in pertinent part: "If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required
to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite statement before interpos-
ing his responsive pleading." See 102 S. Ct. at 1126-27 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. 102 S. Ct. at 1127 (Powell, J., concurring).
65. Id. Justice Powell explained that distinct and palpable injury is a constitutional
requirement of standing under article III. Id. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752, 758 (1982) (article III
requires the party invoking the court's authority to show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant's putatively illegal conduct).
66. 102 S. Ct. at 1127 (Powell, J., concurring).
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jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases and controversies. 7 In
order to make out an actual controversy, the Court has determined
that a petitioner must demonstrate a sufficient personal stake in
the outcome of the dispute as to warrant the invocation of the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts on his behalf." The injury neces-
sary to meet this article III minimum has been variously defined as
injury-in-fact,' 9 or a distinct and palpable injury.
70
Recent decisions have greatly expanded the types of injuries that
may be alleged in support of standing. Non-economic injuries may
suffice, 7 1 and Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the
violation of which will give rise to standing.72 Despite the expan-
sion of the types of injuries which may give rise to standing, all the
decisions have emphasized that the petitioner must still allege an
injury to himself.
7 3
The Supreme Court has also established certain prudential bar-
67. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides: "The judicial power shall extend to all Cases
.. Id.
68. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) ("Have the appellants alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions?").
69. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970)
(allegation that competition by national banks in providing data processing services might
result in future loss of profits to petitioner held to be sufficient allegation of injury-in-fact);
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (damage to the environment caused by
increased freight rates which would reduce recycling of litter held to be sufficient allegation
of injury-in-fact).
70. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72-73 (1978) (allegations of danger to petitioner's environ-
ment from construction of nuclear power plants met distinct and palpable requirement).
An additional constitutional requirement for standing, as delineated by the Court, is a
fairly traceable causal connection between the injury alleged and the conduct being chal-
lenged. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977);
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
71. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The Sierra Club brought a public
interest lawsuit to stop federal officials from approving the creation of a ski resort in the
Sequoia National Forest. The Court held that environmental concerns were sufficient to
grant standing, although it dismissed the Club's claim for lack of standing based on a lack of
personal stake in the dispute. Id. at 740-41.
72. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 500 (1975); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) (private utility com-
pany had standing to sue under statute enjoining the Tennessee Valley Authority from sup-
plying power to two towns within the private company's service area).
73. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 610, 617 (1973) (party seeking review must
himself have suffered an injury); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 500, 501 (1975) (plaintiff still
must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself).
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riers to standing, focusing primarily upon the question of whether
the petitioner is the proper party to bring the claim he wishes to
have litigated before the courts. The prudential barriers to stand-
ing established by the court include: (1) the petitioner must allege
more than a generalized grievance shared in equal measure by a
large number of persons, and (2) petitioner must usually assert his
own rights and cannot base a claim on the rights or interests of
another.7 ' Congress may, however, grant an express or implied
right of action to parties who would be otherwise barred by the
Court's prudential limitations. 7 Both the prudential and the con-
stitutional limitations defined by the Court underscore that the fo-
cus of standing is on the petitioner, and not upon the issues he
wishes to have litigated.76
The Supreme Court has tended to broadly construe standing re-
quirements in cases involving matters of important public policy.
This is especially true in the area of civil rights, as illustrated by
Evers v. Dwyer 7 and Pierson v. Ray.76 In these two cases, relied
upon by Justice Brennan in his Havens opinion, the Supreme
Court granted standing to testers to challenge local segregation or-
dinances. Evers was a black resident of Memphis, Tennessee, who
boarded a municipal bus and seated himself in the white section.79
Evidence presented in the case showed that Evers had never previ-
ously ridden the Memphis buses, and did so on the occasion in
question solely for the purpose of bringing litigation to challenge a
Tennessee statute which required segregated seating on buses.80
The Court held that the tester status of Evers was insignificant,
that an actual controversy between parties with adverse interests
nevertheless existed, and that the case deserved to be heard on its
74. 422 U.S. at 501.
75. Id. Prudential barriers in Fair Housing Act suits were eliminated in Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), and Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
76. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) ("standing fo-
cuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues
he wishes to have adjudicated").
77. 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (per curiam).
78. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
79. 358 U.S. at 203-04. Appellant boarded the bus on April 26, 1956 and seated him-
self in the front. The driver told him to move to the rear, stating that it was required by his
color. When police arrived, appellant left peacefully. Id. at 204.
80. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 65-1074 to 65-1079 (1955).
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merits.8 1 The Court explained its decision by saying that any resi-
dent of a municipality who could not ride its buses without being
subject to special disabilities by statute had a real, immediate and
substantial interest in challenging the validity of that statute.8 2
The petitioners in Pierson were an integrated group of clergy-
men who attempted to use segregated facilities in an interstate bus
terminal in Jackson, Mississippi, fully expecting to be arrested for
their acts.83 The Supreme Court held that the fact that the clergy-
men anticipated their arrest did not constitute consent to that ar-
rest nor deprive them of the right to sue for damages stemming
from it.8 4 This was true, stated the Court, even if the clergymen
had been acting solely to test their right to integrated public
facilities.
8 6
Consistent with decisions such as Evers and Pierson in other ar-
eas of civil rights, the Supreme Court has liberally construed
standing requirements under the Fair Housing Act. In two impor-
tant cases, Gladstone, Realtors v. Villiage of Bellwood,8 e and Traf-
ficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,8 7 the Court eliminated
prudential barriers to standing under the Act's enforcement provi-
sions.8 8 The rationale behind these decisions is that anyone who is
injured by a discriminatory housing practice, either directly or in-
directly, should be entitled to bring an action under the Act.89
Even with the liberal basis for standing established by these deci-
sions, however, there still remained the requirement of a personal
81. 358 U.S. at 203 A three judge district court had dismissed the case on the grounds
that there existed no real controversy. The Supreme Court remanded to the district court
for a hearing on the merits.
82. Id. at 204.
83. 386 U.S. at 558.
84. Id. at 549-50. After their arrest, petitioners waived a jury trial and were convicted
by respondent police justice. One petitioner was awarded a trial de novo on appeal and
received a directed verdict in his favor. The cases against the other petitioners were then
dropped. Petitioners then filed an action in the district court for damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1976) against respondent police justice, and against the arresting officers at common
law for false arrest and imprisonment. 386 U.S. at 549-50.
85. 386 U.S. at 558.
86. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
87. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1976). Section 3610(a) provides for a conciliation proce-
dure through the Department of Housing and Urban Development in an attempt to settle
disputes without necessitating resort to the courts. Id.
89. See 409 U.S. at 211; 441 U.S. at 112.
1982 305
Duquesne Law Review
stake in the outcome of any claim brought under the Act.90 The
plaintiff either had to show that he was frustrated in obtaining
housing by a direct injury to his section 804 rights, or that he was a
resident of a community which had been adversely affected by a
violation of the section 804 rights of another."1
Havens is the first case to hold that standing is available to test-
ers for violations of section 804(d) of the Act. Although nearly uni-
versally accepted by the courts in Fair Housing Act cases, testers
have been used primarily in an evidentiary role.2 For a tester to be
himself a plaintiff, he had to rely on an indirect injury theory, usu-
ally that of being a resident of a community which had been ad-
versely affected by a discriminatory housing practice.93
The Fourth Circuit, in granting tester standing to Coleman and
Willis, did not suggest that they had suffered direct injury under
the Act, but rather granted standing on public policy grounds.,
The court declared that the elimination of housing discrimination
was such an important public concern that it justified the exten-
sion of standing to testers.e5 The court emphasized, however, that
the testers were not directly injured by the false information they
had been given, as they were really acting only as surrogates for
bona fide housing seekers."
The Supreme Court did not follow this public policy rationale,
however, and instead announced for the first time that section
90. See 409 U.S. at 211 (loss of benefits of living in an integrated community was a
particular injury and so there existed a controversy).
91. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. at 213 (section 810(a) was
meant to give standing to all in the same housing unit who were injured by racial discimina-
tion in its management).
92. See Skinner, Fair Housing, the Use of Testers to Enforce Fair Housing Laws,
When Testers are Sued, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 170 (1977). Only § 804(a) of the Act requires a
bona fide offer to rent or purchase, so violations against testers of the other sections of 804
are admissible to prove that a defendant has engaged in practices which violate the Act. The
evidence thus gathered by testers is used to help prove the case of someone who was actu-
ally seeking housing. See Zuch v. John H. Hussey Co., 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975)
aff'd mem. and remanded, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977) (use of testers is permissible and
does not constitute entrapment); Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1974) (use of white
testers permitted in determining whether real estate agency practiced discrimination against
blacks).
93. Bellwood and Trafficante had held that the loss of the benefits of living in an
integrated community was an indirect injury but was still sufficient to afford standing to
residents of affected communities. See 409 U.S. at 212; 441 U.S. at 112.





804(d) created a right to truthful housing information in all per-
sons, the violation of which will create standing. 97 This decision is
difficult to justify in view of the article III requirement of a direct
personal stake in the outcome of a controversy. Despite the fact
that Coleman was given false housing information, she arguably
had no personal stake as a tester in the Havens case beyond that
of a concerned citizen interested in ensuring equal housing oppor-
tunities for everyone. In Sierra Club v. Morton,9e the Court refused
to grant standing to such a party, saying that to do so would result
in the courts becoming a vehicle for enforcing the value prefer-
ences of interested bystanders," a clear violation of the article III
limitation of jurisdiction to actual controversies between parties
with adverse interests. The doctrines of standing were developed
to ensure that all claims reaching the federal courts would be
presented in such a form.100 Never before the Havens decision had
a court considered the giving of false information to testers a suffi-
cient injury to grant them standing, or even that Congress had in-
tended to create a right of action in testers. The real injury in
Havens was done only to actual housing seekers, or to residents of
communities adversely affected by Havens' discriminatory prac-
tices. Coleman was indeed given false information, but it is difficult
to discern what injury she suffered thereby.
Apparently, the Supreme Court shared the Fourth Circuit's view
that fair housing was such an important public concern that it war-
ranted the extension of standing to testers, but preferred to justify
this decision within traditional standing requirements. Only by
creating a section 804(d) right to truthful housing information
could the Court do so. Nevertheless, Coleman, as a tester, does not
meet previous Fair Housing Act standing requirements, as she was
neither an actual housing seeker, nor claiming residency in a com-
munity affected by Havens' steering.101
The Fourth Circuit's public policy rationale for granting tester
standing is more appealing than the Supreme Court's manipula-
tion of the article III requirements, but is itself questionable. The
Fourth Circuit, like the Supreme Court, relied on Evers and Pier-
97. 102 S. Ct. at 1121.
98. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
99. Id. at 735.
100. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
101. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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son in justifying tester standing, stating that those cases were simi-
lar to Havens. Evers and Pierson are distinguishable, however, in
that they involved challenges to statutes aimed at disabling an en-
tire race. The petitioners in those cases were not only members of
the race against which the statute discriminated, but also risked
arrest by performing their testing acts.10 2 Under those circum-
stances, it would seem that the testers in Evers and Pierson had a
greater personal stake than the Havens testers, and also that it
would be difficult to find someone willing to challenge the validity
of the discriminatory statutes. The statute involved in Havens,
however, was an enforcement statute, so Coleman was taking no
risk in performing her testing activities. Additionally, Bellwood
and Trafficante had created such a broad basis for standing in Fair
Housing Act cases 0 s that there is really no need to grant standing
to testers to ensure enforcement of the Act.
The extension of standing to testers by the Supreme Court's
Havens decision is an unfortunate broadening of the standing re-
quirements under the Fair Housing Act. Nothing in the language
of the Court's opinion requires that the testers allege any real in-
terest in a particular case except that of a citizen interested in en-
suring equal housing opportunities for all. While there is real merit
in some of the grievances alleged in Havens itself, the decision
could lead to the courts becoming increasingly burdened with suits
brought by parties seeking to vindicate their own values in a legal
setting.
James M. Barth
102. Indeed, petitioners in Pierson were actually arrested. 386 U.S. at 549.
103. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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